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The Hybrid Ethical Reasoning Agent IMMANUEL
Felix Lindner, Martin Mose Bentzen
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Danish Technical University
The HERA Approach
We introduce a novel software library that supports the implementation
of hybrid ethical reasoning agents (HERA). The objective is to make
moral principles available to robot programming. At its current stage,
HERA can assess the moral permissibility of actions according to the
utilitarianism, the do-no-harm principle, and the principle of double ef-
fect. IMMANUEL (see Figure) is the prototype robot based on HERA.
http://www.hera-project.com
Causal Agency Models
A (boolean) causal agency model MX, is a tuple
〈U = A ∪B, V, F, I = (I1, . . . , Il), X, u,WX〉:
I Actions A = {a1, . . . , am},
I Consequences V = {c1, . . . , cn},
I A causal mechanism F ,
I Intended consequences I = (I1, . . . , Il),
I (Possibly empty) Interventions X,
I Utility function u : literals→ Z,
I Boolean interpretations WX of (A ∪B)−X.
The Bridge-Trolley Case
A trolley has gone out of control and now threatens to
kill five people working on the track. The only way to
save the five workers is to push a man onto the track
thus stopping the tram for the price of only one human
harmed.
Ethical Principles
Ethical principles formulate conditions of permissibility of actions.
I Utilitarianism: An agent is only permitted to perform the action amongst the avaliable alternatives with the overall
maximal utility regardless of what the agent causes and intends. a permissible iff. M |= ∧i u(∧ consa) ≥
u(
∧
consi).
I Do-No-Harm: An agent may not perform an action which has any negative consequences. The distinction
between doing and allowing is relevant to this principle, as it is the causal consequences of an action which are
considered. a permissible iff. M |= ∧c(a c→ u(c) ≥ 0).
I Double-Effect Principle: An action a with direct consequences ci is permissible iff. 1) a itself is morally good or
indifferent (M,a |= u(a) ≥ 0), 2) the negative consequence are not intended (M,a |= ∧i(Iaci → u(ci) ≥ 0)),
3) a positive consequence is intended (M,a |= ∨i(Iaci ∧ u(ci) > 0)), 4) negative consequences are not a
means to obtain some positive consequence (M,a |= ∧i¬(ci  cj ∧ 0 > u(ci) ∧ u(cj) > 0)), 5) there is
proportionally grave reasons to prefer the positive consequence while permitting the negative consequence
(M,a |= u(∧ consa) > 0)).
Reasoning Outcomes
Utilitarianism permits push and forbids refrain. Do-No-Harm forbids push and permits refrain. Double-Effect Princi-
ple forbids push and is not applicable to refrain.
